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The debate over the curse of natural resources has 
haunted developing countries for decades if not centuries. 
A review of existing empirical evidence suggests that 
the curse remains elusive. The fragile negative effect of 
natural resources on economic growth might be due 
to international heterogeneity in the effects of natural 
resources on economic growth, to the use of weak 
indicators of natural resources that might be unrelated 
to relative natural-resource endowments, or to the 
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inability of econometric analysis based on international 
data to capture historical processes. This paper defends 
an empirical proxy for relative abundance of natural 
resources, which is based on standard growth theory. 
In turn, various econometric estimations are hopelessly 
deployed in the search for the missing resource curse. 
Some evidence suggests that natural resources might 
have large positive effects whose true magnitude remains 
unknown due to unresolved econometric issues.  
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 I. Introduction 
 
  Like Dracula, the notion of a natural resource curse remerges periodically, haunting 
the development debate, striking fear into the hearts of policy makers, and causing 
quantities of ink to be spilled on the various ways in which being blessed with mineral, 
agricultural or other natural wealth, will lead to anemic growth performance.   Adam Smith 
(1776) was perhaps first to articulate a concern that mining was a bad use of labor and 
capital and should be discouraged.
1 The idea reappeared in the mid 1950s in Latin America 
when Raúl Prebisch (1959), observing slowing regional growth, argued that natural 
resource industries had fewer possibilities for technological progress and were condemned 
to decreasing relative prices on their exports. These stylized facts helped justify the Import-
Substitution experiment in modifying national productive structures. Subsequently, 
disenchantment with the inefficiencies of protectionism and the consequences of populist 
macroeconomic policies led to more open trade regimes and less intrusive micro economic 
policies, partly with the example of East Asia’s rapid export-led growth in mind. 
 
  However, over the interim, two stylized facts have emerged to convert a new 
generation of analysts to believers in the curse. First, the liberalizing economies, with some 
notable exceptions, did not become manufacturing dynamos, or major participants in what 
is loosely called the new “knowledge economy.” Further, growth results were not 
impressive and, in the case of Africa, dramatic falls in commodity prices contributed to 
negative growth rates. With the increased popularity of cross country growth regressions in 
the 1990s,  numerous authors offered proof that, in fact, natural resources appeared to curse 
countries with slower growth: Auty (1993), Davis (1995), Gylfason et al (1999), Neumayer 
(2004), Mehlum Moene and Torvik (2006), and arguably most influentially, with several 
authors drawing on their data and approach, Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001),  have argued 
empirically that since the 1960s the resource-rich developing countries across the world 
have grown slower than other developing countries. Last year Macartan Humphey, Jeffrey 
Sachs, and Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz published Escaping the Resource Curse, 
which adds further credence to the myth.  Consequently, we find ourselves again in a time 
when the conventional wisdom postulates that natural resources are a drag on development, 
which contradicts the common-sense view that natural riches are riches nonetheless.  
 
  Yet there has always been a countervailing current that suggests that common sense 
was not, in this case, misleading.  Most recently, evidence supportive of a more positive 
view was brought together in Lederman and Maloney (2007) in Natural Resources, Neither 
Curse nor Destiny, although, far earlier notable observers such as Douglass North and 
Jacob Viner had dissented on the inherent inferiority of, for instance, agriculture relative to 
manufacturing.   Even as Adam Smith was writing the Wealth of Nations, the American 
colonies were declaring their independence on their way to being one of the richest nations 
in the history of humanity, based for a long period, largely on natural resources (see, for 
example, Findlay and Lundahl 1994). Other success stories – Australia, Canada, Finland, 
                                                 
1 “Projects of mining, instead of replacing capital employed in them, together with ordinary profits of stock, 
commonly absorb both capital and stock. They are the projects, therefore, to which of all others a prudent 
law-giver, who desired to increase the capital of his nation, would least choose to give any extraordinary 
encouragement …” 
  1and Sweden – remain, to date, net exporters of natural resources.
2 Latin America’s and 
Africa’s disappointing experiences clearly offer a counterbalance to these success stories, 
but they do not negate them.  
 
    The acknowledgment of the important heterogeneity of experiences has led 
tentatively to a greater circumspection about the impact of resources, although not 
necessarily less enchantment with the term “curse.”  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz begin 
their book noting that resource countries often perform worse than their resource poor 
comparators, and Dunning (2005) talks of “conditional resource curse” – that is, under 
certain conditions, there is a negative growth impact. This is without a doubt a more careful 
way to frame the issue that moves explaining the heterogeneity to center stage. Yet, the 
notion of a resource “curse” suggests more than the existence of a negative tail in the 
distribution of impact. Dracula’s sinister reputation arises not from the occasional 
involuntary transfusion when in Transylvania, but rather that a bloody parasitism is the 
central tendency of character. (Disclaimer: the authors have not reviewed carefully any of 
the relevant empirical literature on this topic.)
3   
 
  This article builds on our earlier work to argue that such a negative central tendency 
does not characterize natural resource abundance, and we would do well to exorcise the 
curse from the economic discourse.  The next section reviews the various channels through 
which the curse is thought to operate, and we argue that, in many cases, the channel is 
either not convincingly present, or in fact, applies to many other factors of production.  We 
then review some of the existing literature, arguing that the existing stylized fact of a curse 
is tentative at best and certainly not robust enough to impugn an entire category of 
production. We then examine with more care the appropriate proxy for measuring resource 
curse effects and, in the process, suggest what may be driving some other findings of a 
negative impact. Finally, using our preferred proxy, we deploy various estimations methods 
in search of the missing curse, including an aspect of the resource curse we left relatively 
unexplored in Neither Curse nor Destiny, the voracious political economy channel.   
Though our results in this dimension are, to some degree, rudimentary, they are suggestive 
                                                 
2  Across time, notable thinkers have also been less credulous about the existence of a curse.  In Prebisch’s 
era, future Nobel Prize winner Douglass North (1955 p.252) argued that “the contention that regions must 
industrialize in order to continue to grow ... [is] based on some fundamental misconceptions;” and the pioneer 
trade economist Jacob Viner argued that “There are no inherent advantages of manufacturing over 
agriculture” (Viner,  1952 p. 72).  The literature is clear that these development successes based their growth 
on natural resources and several still do (see figure 1). See Irwin (2000) for the US; Innis (1933) and Watkins 
(1963) for Canada; Wright (2001), Czelusta (2001) for Australia;  Blomström and Kokko (2001) and 
Blomström and Meller (1987) for Scandinavia. Latin America also offers its success stories: Monterrey in 
Mexico, Medellin in Colombia, and São Paolo in Brazil all grew to become dynamic industrial centers based 
on mining and in the latter two cases, coffee. Copper-rich Chile has been the region’s model economy since 
the late 1980s.  
3 We don’t for example, talk about a “venture capital” curse because 19 out of 20 VC financed firms go 
bankrupt. If the central tendency is that NR have a positive effect, then they remain a blessing, albeit 
conditional, and we need to understand the complementary factors necessary to maximize it. This is not 
different than understanding why  Taiwan did better with its electronics industry than Mexico; or that Italy did 
better with its fashion industry than Korea did with “Project Milan.”   
 
  2that this element of the curse, too, merits closer scrutiny and might be a figment of our 
statistical imagination.   
 
II.  The Mechanics of the Curse 
    
  Numerous channels through which the curse might operate have been offered. Here 
we discuss only a few. 
 
  First, Prebisch (1959), among others, popularized the idea that terms of trade of 
natural resource exporters would experience a secular decline over time relative to those of 
exporters of manufactures. However, Cuddington, Ludema and Jayasuriya (2007) find that 
they cannot reject that relative commodity prices follow a random walk across the 20
th 
century with a single break in 1929. That is, there is no intrinsic force driving the observed 
decline and prices could as easily rise tomorrow as fall further. While commodity by 
commodity important mean reverting components are evident and are, in fact, necessary for 
stabilization funds to be viable, the notion that long run prices have a strong unpredictable 
and permanent component appears more relevant today than at any time across the last half 
century. Paul Krugman (2008), taking exactly the opposite position from Prebisch, argues 
that continued growth by China and India, combined with simply “running out of planet” 
will lead to continued strong excess demand such that “rich countries will face steady 




  Second, beginning with Smith, observers have argued that natural resources are 
associated with lower human and physical capital accumulation, productivity growth, and 
spillovers.  This case is far from proven, however. Consistent with Viner’s (1952) early 
assertion, Martin and Mitra (2001) find total factor productivity growth to be higher in 
agriculture than in manufactures in a large sample of advanced and developing countries.  
Wright and Czelusta (2006) and Irwin (2000) have argued that, contrary to Smith’s 
prejudice, mining is a dynamic and knowledge intensive industry in many countries and 
was critical to US development.  Blomstrom and Kokko (2006) have argued the same for 
forestry in Scandinavia.  
 
  Several authors stress the complementarity of essential factors, particularly human 
capital (see Gylfason and Bravo Ortega and de Gregorio 2007). Relatedly, Maloney (2002, 
2007) argues that Latin America missed opportunities for rapid resource-based growth due 
to deficient technological adoption driven by two factors. First, deficient national 
“learning” or “innovative” capacity, arising from low investment in human capital and 
scientific infrastructure, led to weak capacity to innovate or even take advantage of 
technological advances abroad.  Second, the period of inward-looking industrialization 
discouraged innovation and created a sector whose growth depended on artificial monopoly 
rents rather than the quasi-rents arising from technological adoption, and at the same time 
undermined natural-resource-intensive sectors that had the potential for dynamic growth. 
Røed Larsen (2004) argues that  Norway’s surge from Scandanavian laggard in the 1960s 
to regional leader in per capita income was based largely on the opposite strategy and 
                                                 
4 Krugman, Paul, “Running Out of Planet to Exploit,” The New York Times, March 21, 2008. 
  3concludes that “Norwegian oil is a high technology sector which we may assume has much 
the same positive spillover effects as manufacturing is supposed to have” (p 17).  
 
  These arguments are central to the discussion surrounding the “Dutch Disease” 
aspect of the curse emphasized by, among others, Gylfason et al (1999), Sachs and Warner 
(2001) where perhaps through an appreciated exchange rate or classic Rybczinski effects, 
resource booms depress manufacturing activity.  If the natural resource sector is not inferior 
in terms of its growth potential, then this sectoral shift would be of similar import to the 
canonical displacement of agriculture by manufacturing, or the finance-driven exchange 
rate effects arising from the City of London on manufacturing in the United Kingdom.   
  
  Third, either for reasons of history or Dutch disease, natural resource abundance 
may result in high levels of export concentration, which may lead to higher export price 
volatility and hence greater macro volatility.
5  However this is a more general concern. 
Dependence on any one export, be it copper in Chile or potentially micro-chips in Costa 
Rica, can leave a country vulnerable to sharp and sudden declines in terms of trade with 
attendant channels of influence through volatility. 
 
  Fourth, another important literature suggests that natural riches produce institutional 
weaknesses (see, among others, Auty 2001, 2005, Ross 1999, Gelb 1988 Easterly, and 
Levine 2002). Tornell and Lane (1999) described the phenomenon where various social 
groups attempt to capture the economic rents derived from the exploitation of natural 
resources as the “voracity effect.”  Subsequent refinements have focused on how “point 
source” natural resources -those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base, 
such as oil or minerals- and plantation crops have more detrimental effects than those that 
are diffuse such as livestock  or agricultural produce from small family farms (Murshed  
2004, Isham et al 2006).  But again, this concern is not specific to natural resources, but to 
any source of rents. Autey, for instance, points to a similar impact of foreign aid.     
“Natural” monopolies, such as telecom have given rise to precisely the same effects in 
Mexico, and the rent-seeking literature generated by Krueger (1974)often focused on the 
adverse political economy effects arising from trade restrictions. Rajan and Zingales (2004) 
in Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists examine rentier attitudes among the corporate, 
including manufacturing and financial elite, and the need for financial markets to ensure the 
pressure of new entry.    
 
  That said, there is clearly an important agenda to understand the interaction between 
political institutions and the emergence of resource sectors. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 
(2006) have argued the importance of strong institutions to minimize rent seeking activity, 
and Rodríguez and Gomolin (2008) stress the pre-existing centralized state and 
professionalized military as essential to Venezuela’s stellar growth performance during 
1920-1970 after the oil exploitation began in 1920. Dunning (2005) offers a model of how 
differences in the world structure of resources, the degree of societal opposition to elites, 
and the prior development of the non-resource private sector help predict the incentives to 
diversification and political stability.   
                                                 
5 Sachs and Warner (1995b) argue that Dutch disease leads to concentration in resource exports, which they 
assume to have fewer possibilities for productivity growth.  
  4III.  The Elusive Curse 
 
  Without question, many of the channels discussed above may have important 
implications for growth. However, the question is whether taking all these impacts together, 
resource abundance has, as a central tendency, curse-like qualities.  The literature has used 
a variety of proxies for resource abundance but has not been able to demonstrate this.  
 
  By far, the best known empirical tests for the resource curse are found in the work 
of Sachs and Warner (1995a, 1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2001a,b) who employ natural resource 
exports as a share of GDP as their proxy.  Using cross sectional data employed previously 
by Barro (1991); Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992); and DeLong and Summers (1991) 
across the period 1970-1990, they persistently find a negative correlation with growth, 
much to the alarm of many resource abundant developing countries.
6 Yet, this proxy leads 
to some counterintuitive results as a measure of resource abundance. Singapore, for 
example, due to its substantial re-exports of raw materials, appears very resource abundant 
and given its high growth rates, even seems to impart a positive relationship between 
resource abundance and growth. Because this gross measure is clearly not capturing the 
country’s true factor endowments, Sachs and Warner replaced the values of Singapore and 
Trinidad and Tobago with net resource exports as a share of GDP (see data appendix in 
Sachs and Warner 1997a).  It is not clear why net values should only be used for these two 
cases.  Numerous countries in Asia and Latin America have a large presence of export 
processing zones that would, using the gross measure, overstate their true abundance in 
manufacturing related factors.
7  The issue turns out to be central to the findings of a curse. 
When Lederman and Maloney (2007) replicate the Sachs-Warner results using either a net 
measure of resource exports, or using the gross export measure without the adjustments for 
the two countries, they find that the negative impact of natural-resource abundance on 
growth disappears.  
 
  In fact, the interpretation of the Sachs Warner results is not clear even using their 
modified data. Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) in their search for robust regressors across   
millions of growth regressions find a persistent negative sign when the proxy enters, but it 
is not robust enough to be considered a core explanatory variable for growth as other 
variables appear to absorb its influence. In a similar vein, Lederman and Maloney (2007) 
show that, controlling for fixed effects in a panel context, the negative impact of resources 
also goes away suggesting that it is not their particular proxy, but its correlation with 
unobserved country characteristics that are driving the result.  Manzano and Rigobón 
(2007) concur, and argue that the cross sectional result arises from the accumulation of 
foreign debt during periods when commodity prices were high, especially during the 1970s, 
that lead to a stifling debt overhang when prices fell.  These results, and the analogy to 
                                                 
6 The other papers by Sachs and Warner (1995b, 1997b, 1999, 2001a, 2001b) contain the basic results of 
1997a, at times using a slightly longer time span (1965-1990 instead of 1970-1989), and often including 
additional time-invariant explanatory variables such as dummies identifying tropical and landlocked 
countries, plus some additional social variables.  
7 The variable also shows substantial volatility over time reflecting terms of trade movements and hence the 
average for the period is probably a better measure than the initial period value that was used by Sachs and 
Warner in several of their papers.    
 
  5other bubbles, are important, not only because they further dispel the alleged curse of 
natural resources, but especially because the policy implication is that the right levers to 
deal with the lackluster performance of resource-rich developing countries in recent 
decades lies in the realm of macroeconomic policy instead of trade or industrial policies.  
 
  Bravo-Ortega and de Gregorio (2007) using the same proxy (as well as natural 
resource exports over total merchandise exports), also find a negative cross sectional 
impact but trace its origin to a Dutch disease effect working through human capital.   
Adding an interactive human capital term suggests that as the stock of human capital rises, 
the marginal effect of the stock of natural resources on income growth rises and becomes 
positive.  This is broadly consistent with Gylfason et al’s argument that a national effort in 
education is especially necessary in resource-rich countries, although without their 
hypothesis that resource-rich sectors intrinsically require, and hence induce, less education. 
However, Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio find that the point at which resources begin to 
contribute positively to growth occurs at around 3 years of education, a level achieved by 
all but the poorest countries.  
 
  Sachs and Vial (2002), Sachs and Warner (1995) confirm a negative and robust 
relationship using a second, related proxy- the share of natural resources exports in total 
exports, and this proved somewhat more robust.  However, it, again, does not make Sala-i-
Martin et al’s core of robust regressors.  Further, when Lederman and Maloney include a 
generic measure of concentration, the Herfindahl index, using export data disaggregated at 
4-digit SITC, the resource curse disappears. The curse is one of concentration, not 
resources.  This finding is consistent with Auty’s (2000) concern about a resource drag on 
growth arising from the limited possibilities of diversification within commodities.   
However, Lederman and Xu (2007) argue that diversification into non-resource sectors 
from a strong resource base is feasible.   
 
  Leamer (1984) argues that standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory dictates that the 
appropriate measure is net exports of resources per worker.  This measure has been the 
basis for extensive research on the determinants of trade patterns (e.g., Trefler 1995, 
Antweiler and Trefler 2002, Estevadeordal and Taylor 2002).
8 This was Lederman and 
Maloney’s (2007) preferred measure because it obviated the Singapore issue by netting out 
resource exports from the beginning.
9  In cross section and in panel context across the 
Sachs-Warner period, it yielded either insignificant or positive results. Using Maddison’s 
(1994) growth data from 1820-1989, Maloney (2002, 2007) finds suggestive evidence of a 
positive growth impact of resources from 1820-1950, but then a negative impact thereafter, 
driven by Latin America’s underperformance.  
                                                 
8 Assuming identical preferences, a country will show positive net exports of resource intensive goods if its 
share of productivity-adjusted world endowments exceeds its share of world consumption. Usually, the net 
exports are then measured with respect to the quantity of other factors of production, such as the labor force. 
9 It is worth mentioning that the cited references show that the HO model of factor endowments performs 
relatively well for natural resources net exports, but it performs less well for manufactures. The current debate 
in the trade literature revolves around the question of how the HO model might be amended (by considering, 
for example, technological differences across countries, or economies of scale) to help predict better the 
observed patterns of net exports across countries. But there is not debate about the use of net exports as a 
proxy for revealed comparative advantage in this literature.  
  6 
  Finally, a set of papers explore the impact of more direct measures of mining 
production or reserves. Stijns (2005) finds no correlation of fuel and mineral reserves on 
growth during 1970-1989. This confirms earlier work by Davis (1995) that mineral 
dependent economies, defined by high share of minerals in exports and GDP, did well 
relative to other countries across the 1970s and 1980s.  Across their several million 
regressions, Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) find the mining share in GDP to be consistently 
positive and in the core of explanatory variables. Nunn (2008) finds a positive partial 
correlation between the per capita production of gold, oil, and diamonds and GDP per 
capita, in an analysis of long-term fundamental determinants of development, with a special 
focus on the role of the slave trade and its concomitant economic consequences for African 
economies. Most recently, Brunnschweiler (2008) finds that per capita mineral and fuel 
production in 1970 have direct positive effects on economic growth during 1970-2000.  
 
  Clearly the resource curse remains elusive. The cross-country econometric evidence 
remains weak, with results changing depending on the empirical proxies used to represent 
relative endowments. Moreover, there have been surprisingly few efforts to understand the 
theoretical content of trade-data proxies. The following section puts the literature in 
theoretical context, which in turn helps motivate our empirical strategy.  
 
IV. Clarifying the Curse  
 
Some simple algebra helps clarify some dimensions of the curse and possible 
approaches and pitfalls to measuring it.  Start with a two-factor and two-goods economy, 
where labor is initially immobile across sectors, and endowments of natural resources can 
only be used to produce natural-resource-intensive commodities. Denoting the natural-
resource sector by subscript “nr” and rest of the economy by subscript “1,” domestic 
equilibrium in the labor market entails all labor, L, is fully employed: 
 
(3) L=L1 + Lnr 
 
National income is simply the sum of the income produced by each sector: 
 
(4) Y=Y1 + Ynr.  
 
Let K denote the endowment (stock) of natural resources, which are used only in the 
production of related commodities.
10 Each sector has a production function determined by 
sector-specific technologies with constant returns to scale: 
 
(5) Y1=a1LL1, and 
 








                                                 
10 The modeling approach with a stock of productive resources is standard in the growth literature, and it also 
appears in recent studies of natural resource production functions (Peretto 2008). 
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The a’s are technologically determined productivity parameters. In the case of sector 1, a1L 
is output per worker, which is always positive. In the case of the natural-resource sector, anr 
is the output per complementary units of K and L. Parameter “b” is the natural-resource 
share in output of that sector, and it is bounded by zero and one.  
 
By fully differentiating (7), it is easy to show that the marginal effect of natural 
resource endowments on national income has three components under the assumptions that 
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The first two elements in (8) are the effects of marginal changes or differences in K 
on factor productivities. The literature on the voracity effect, for example, can be 
interpreted as negative first derivatives of productivity with respect to K. As pointed out by 
Rodríguez (2007), the empirical endogenous growth literature has revolved around the 
issue of the multiplicity of variables that could affect an economy’s efficiency of factor use, 
and institutions have been part of that debate.  The third element is the marginal effect of K 
on Y through the reallocation of labor, the Dutch disease effect. If labor in the natural-
resource sector increases, then income from the rest of the economy falls as it loses labor, 
but output rises in the natural-resource sector. The net effect of the reallocation effect will 
depend on the difference in the effective labor productivities across the two sectors. This 
issue is usually framed as the alternative sector, perhaps manufactures, exhibiting some 
externality or that it implies that the private optimization that leads to the reallocation of 
labor implies a social loss somehow.  The fourth term is the marginal effect on the output of 
the natural-resource sector, which is equal to the marginal productivity of K’s share in 
natural-resource output. 
 
 In a nutshell, various strands of the curse literature argue that, with greater or lesser 
weight put on particular arguments: 
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the long-run.  
  8 
  Unfortunately for empirical work, K is unobserved. Even data on known mining 
reserves is inadequate as endogenous investments in exploration lead to new discoveries. 
As discussed, some studies use output of oil or mining as a share of GDP (e.g., Nunn 2008, 
Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004), which appear positively correlated with GDP per capita or 
subsequent economic growth. Other studies use gross export receipts as a share of total 
merchandise exports or as a share of GDP (e.g., Sachs and Warner 1997, 2001; Bravo-
Ortega and De Gregorio 2007, Gylfason 2004). These proxies of natural resource 
dependence are found to be positively correlated with GDP per capita (Bravo-Ortega and 




V. Empirical Strategy  
 
The discussion above suggests that empirically the resource curse, like Dracula, is 
hard to nail down. More specifically, getting the right proxy for resource abundance, and 
understanding its properties, is critical to establishing the credibility of any empirical 
finding. The mining reserve measures are closest to measuring true abundance, but capture 
only a narrow range of products and hence do not obviate the need for a trade based proxy.   
 
In taking up the search for the curse again, we follow the vast literature on growth 
empirics but with a couple of innovations that help us identify a floor of the effect natural 
resource endowments. A key innovation is the inclusion of the trade-data indicator of 
relative endowments, which has the desirable property of an expected positive correlation 
between natural-resource endowments per worker, which is not the case for the preferred 
proxies used by resource-curse believers. We also choose an institutional variable that is 
commonplace in the institutions and growth literature concerning the powers of the 
executive branch of government, which has been absent in the voracity effects empirical 
literature.  
 
V. A. Empirical strategy: static and dynamic growth models  
 
  If relative endowments were observed, an empirical income function consistent with 
the economic growth literature can be written as: 
 
(9) yi = a + h(ln(K/L)i) + f’Xi + ei , 
 
where the subscripts represent countries, a is the intercept, y is the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity, X is matrix of other determinants of 
cross-country income differences, and e is assumed to be white noise error. The 
corresponding literature includes Frankel and Romer (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and 
                                                 
11 Isham et al. (2005) used dummy variables to identify countries according to export structures by looking 
only at the top two merchandise exports (according to the three-digit SITC trade classification), which further 
confounds the notion of natural resource dependence. It is also noteworthy, as mentioned earlier in this paper, 
that papers that have relied on the Sachs and Warner data are actually using a observations that use the gross 
exports of natural resources as a share of merchandise exports where a couple of observations, Singapore and 
Trinidad & Tobago, were actually net exports of natural resources.  
  9Robinson (2001), Glaeser et al. (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), and Nunn (2008). 
We call this the “static” growth model.  
 
  The general form of the dynamic empirical growth model found in the literature 
since Barro (1991) is: 
 
(10) yi,t - yi,t-1 = a + g(yi,t-1 ) + h(ln(K/L)i,t) + f’Xi,t + ei,t . 
 
The obvious difference between equations (9) and (10) is the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable as a regressor. Parameter g is the so-called convergence coefficient, 
which is interpreted as the conditional rate of convergence between poor and rich countries 
when g<0. This model is the dynamic version of (9), and g-1 is equal to the autoregressive 
coefficient of y, because the lagged value of y also appears with a negative sign in the left-
hand side. We present estimates of the static and dynamic growth models, but with K/L 
replaced with a proxy discussed below.   
 
V.B. A proxy of relative endowments with desirable properties: Net exports per worker 
 
A good proxy has to be positively correlated with the relevant endowments, so that we can 
interpret a growth-regression coefficient as truly capturing the effect of these endowments. 
Our preferred indicator is net exports per worker. Net exports are simply the difference 
between what is produced and what is consumed in the domestic market: 
 
(11)  () ( ) ) 1 ( ) / ( 1 / 1 nr L nr
b
nr nr nr nr nr l a c L K a c L C Y L
NX − − − = − =
,  
 
where 0 ≤ lnr=(Lnr/L) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ cnr ≤1. The selling point of this indicator is that it strictly 
rises with K/L, because the consumption of natural resources is a fraction of total income, 
0< cnr <1, and, following Rybcynski, labor is attracted to the resource sector as the 
endowment expands:   
 
(12)  ( )
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It is, however, not without flaws. When used as a proxy for K/L in the estimation of 
income or growth models, it results in two distinct problems, which are both related to the 
consumption of natural resources, which rises as income grows and as the endowments 
grow.  
 
The fact that income growth also increases consumption introduces a biased 
estimate of the partial correlation between NX/L and y.. This issue strikes us as non-trivial.   
Figures 1 and 2 show the relationship between the log of the absolute value of average net 
exports per worker during 1980-2005 and the log of GDP per capita for exporters and 
importers of natural resources. There is a strong positive correlation for both sub-samples, 
  10and the bi-variate elasticity is close to one in both cases. While the positive correlation of 
the net exporters with income suggests that there is no resource curse in levels, the strong 
negative correlation of net importers of natural resources strikes us as most plausibly 
evidence of increased consumption of NR with development, with potentially symmetrical 
effects on imports and exports. This issue is even more extreme where a rise in income 
from non-resource related sectors leads to an increase in consumption of resources, giving 
rise to a negative correlation of growth and NX/L. If this is the case, and the technical 
annex suggests it is algebraically likely, then the negative bias of the coefficient of net 
exports is substantial. 
 
The second problem created by the use of our preferred proxy, which is related to a 
consumption effect of increases in K/L, affects the inferences that can be drawn even from 
unbiased estimates of the (causal) partial correlation between Y and NX/L. It is clear from 
equation (12) that a rise in endowments also gives rise to increased imports and, 
symmetrically, decreased exports of NR that mutes the degree to which movements in 
NX/L reflect movements in K/L.     
   
  Operationally, to moderate the bias in the estimate of the coefficient of NX/L in 
income and growth functions, we include imports of natural resources per worker as an 
additional regressor in the empirical models. Under the assumption that there is also a 
symmetrical effect on exports, then the sum of the coefficients on NX/L and M/L is a good 
approximation to the effect of NX/L on y. After this adjustment, we still need to be careful 
about drawing inferences about the effect of K/L on y based on this unbiased estimate, 
because it is still potentially a magnified effect of K/L on y – see the technical annex.    
 
   Still, we think this proxy is preferable to other popular indicators of natural-resource 
dependence used in the curse literature simply because these are not strictly positively 
correlated with K/L. The ratio of gross natural resource exports over GDP, in addition to 
the entrepot (Singapore) problem discussed earlier, potentially can be negatively correlated 
with K since a rise in K leads to a rise in exports which may be less than any induced rise in 
Y.
12 Gross exports (which is an unknown fraction of national production) of natural 
resources as a share of total merchandise exports can be negatively correlated with K/L 
when the share of consumption of natural resources in national income, such as agricultural 
products and food, is larger than the consumption share of other goods.  Though it may be 
interesting as a measure of NR exports per se, and perhaps more generally as the 
concentration of exports, it is not an especially good if the goal is to show that resource 
endowments themselves are pernicious.  
  
   
V. D. Executive constraints as key institutional variable and other controls 
 
  As Levine and Renelt (1992) first pointed out in the growth context, cross-country 
growth regressions are sensitive to the control variables included in the specification. A 
substantial portion of the empirical growth literature focuses on the neoclassical growth 
model, where the basic conditioning variables are related to capital accumulation and 
                                                 
12 It is straightforward calculus to derive these conditions. They are available from the authors upon request.  
  11growth of the labor force per unit of capital. In this regard, we follow the classic paper by 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) in our most fully specified models.  
 
Regarding institutions, the literature on the resource curse recently put emphasis on 
the role of so-called “point-source” resources. Isham et al. (2005, 143) define point source 
natural resources as “… those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base, such 
as oil, minerals (such as copper and diamonds), and plantation crops (such as sugar and 
bananas)….” They argue that “Where extractive institutions were initially laid down, they 
soon consolidated themselves in ways that reduced the likelihood that over time they would 
have an interest in generating – or in being subjected to countervailing pressures to generate 
– either more diverse revenue (export) streams or more open political structures” (Isham et 
al. 2005, 145-6). These statements consequently imply that natural resources should be 
positively correlated with political characteristics that entail weak checks and balances, 
which would otherwise limit the capacity of the rentier elites to control these resources and 
public policies that might hamper economic diversification. In turn, the literature suggests 
that such institutional characteristics are negatively correlated with long-term GDP per 
capita.  
 
  It is possible, however, that under certain institutional arrangements, the resource 
curse might come alive. That is, natural resources might not produce poor institutions as in 
Isham et al. (2005), but when they interact with certain types of political institutions, 
natural resources might hamper development. For example, as the voracity effect is a 
problem of governing the commons, political institutions that yield fragmented and 
multiple coalitions might be associated with a natural resource curse. This is the argument 
by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). But it should be noted that this is a different 
argument about heterogeneity of the effects of natural resources, similar to the concerns 
raised by Dunning (2005). Hence it is entirely consistent with the idea that natural 
resources might not necessarily produce institutional outcomes that in turn interact with 
natural resources to produce a curse. Our empirical exercises focus on testing this latter 
hypothesis, and we leave it for future research to test for interactions between institutions 




In light of the discussion above, we include four interactive terms in the estimation 
of 9 above:  dummy variables for net exporters and net importers are multiplied with the 
natural logarithm of the absolute value of net exports of natural resources per worker. In 
addition, the (log of) imports of natural resources per worker are also interacted with the 
relevant dummies.  
 
To assess the possibility of heterogenous effects of resources due to interactions 
with other non-observables, such as institutional quality, As mentioned, coefficient 
heterogeneity is a concern in growth regressions   we estimate Quantile Regressions of our 
basic model with only two conditioning variables (the Sachs-Warner reform index and the 
growth of terms of trade) followed by a more fully specified model that includes 
macroeconomic volatility, and the Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992, MRW henceforth) 
neo-classical growth variables. While recent literature has taken other approaches to 
  12dealing with heterogeneity in growth regressions (see, also, Durlauf, Kourtellos, and 
Minkin 2001),  Quantile Regressions provide estimates of the coefficients across the 
conditional distribution of the sample, for example, by allowing the bottom 25% of 
observations to be below the predicted values, while at the same time estimating the 
coefficients conditional on having 50% percent of the sample above and below the 
predictions, as well as the top 75% of the sample. If the coefficients are sufficiently 
different, then we can conclude that resources have distinct effects in different country 
contexts.  The regression errors from each quantile are allowed to be correlated and they are 
bootstrapped (with 100 interactions of random sub-samples), because they are unknown a 
priori.  
 
The discussion of the Quantile Regressions is followed by the presentation of 3SLS 
estimations of the basic and the fuller specifications of (9), but adding the Acemoglu-
Robinson institutional variable. We explore the role of institutions, namely constraints on 
the executive branch, which could be affected by the relative abundance of natural 
resources according to the resource curse hypothesis. We follow the relevant literature on 
institutions and growth by complementing the static GDP per capita function with the 
population densities of countries circa 1500 as the identifying instrumental variable of the 
3SLS estimator, which is the approach of Acemoglu and Robinson (2002, 2005) and 
Glaeser et al. (2004).
13 3SLS allows for the simultaneous estimation of the growth and 
institutional equation, with different explanatory variables in each structural equation. For 
example, imports of natural resources per worker appear in the growth equation, but not as 
a determinant of executive constraints.  
 
VI. Data and Bi-variate Correlations 
 
  Standard publicly available sources offer all the necessary data to implement our 
empirical strategy. The relevant variables are averaged over the 1980-2005 period. Table 
A1 in the Appendix lists the variable definitions and sources.  
 
VI. A. Variable definitions and data sources 
 
The dependent variables are the real GDP per capita, its average annual growth rate 
between 1980 and 2005, and the average annual growth rate in each five year period. The 
data come from the latest version of the Penn World Tables, which has data until 2004. The 
year 2005 is derived by applying the real growth rate of GDP per capita in local currency 
and constant domestic prices between 2004 and 2005.  
 
                                                 
13 There are numerous potential pitfalls in the estimation of the GDP per capita in levels model with 2SLS 
even when we can conclude that the IV is correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable but not with 
the dependent variable. One is that the chosen instrument could be weak in the sense of explaining a very low 
share of the variance of the endogenous variable (executive constraints in this application); see Dollar and 
Kraay (2003) for a similar application. Another related pitfall is that the variance of the endogenous variable 
that explains the variance of the dependent variable should be related to the variance of the instrumental 
variable – see Dunning (2008). As discussed in the results section, these issues became unimportant since we 
did not find much evidence that executive constraint affects the underlying relationship between our proxy for 
relative natural-resource endowments and development.  
  13The main explanatory variable of interest, as mentioned, is the natural logarithm of 
the absolute value of net exports of natural resources per worker. The trade data come from 
UNCOMTRADE, as downloaded from the World Bank’s data server. The commodity 
groups of products classified as being intensive in the use of natural resources are Leamer’s 
(1984, 1995) non-manufacturing commodities – see Table A1.  
 
  Regarding the conditioning variables, we follow the strategy in Lederman and 
Maloney (2007) by examining how changes in the specification of the model affect the 
coefficient on the natural-resource variables. The initial multi-variate regression model 
specification includes two variables in addition to the natural-resource proxies: (a) the share 
of years during 1980-1999 when the dummy variable for policy reform was observed, as 
per the data in Wacziarg and Welch (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1995);
14 (b) and the 
average annual growth of the terms of trade during 1980-2005, which comes from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators data, as downloaded in early 2008.  
 
  The augmented model includes the executive constraints variable, which is the 
institutional variable used in Acemoglu and Robinson (2002, 2005) and Glaeser et al. 
(2004). The data come from the Polity IV database, and has a value that ranges between 1 
and 7, with higher values representing less executive-branch discretion. The econometric 
models include the natural logarithm of this variable, which makes it easier to interpret 
coefficient estimates as elasticities. The literature argues that constraints on the Executive 
should be negatively partially correlated, in the first stage of 2SLS estimations, with 
historical population density.
15 Due to the limited coverage of the historical population 
density variable, we present two sets of 3SLS estimations of the static and dynamic models; 
one with the limited sample and another with a sample that incorporates observations with 
imputed values for population density circa 1500. This allows for a discussion about how 
the limited sample affects the estimated coefficients.
16  
                                                 
14 The policy reform index is one if import tariffs are below 40%, if there are not significant non-tariff 
barriers, if governments have privatized a significant share of public enterprises, and if the foreign-exchange 
black market premium is below a certain threshold – see the Data Appendix for details.   
15 High population densities circa 1500 are presumably associated with the localization of extractive activities 
and slave trade rather than with permanent settlement. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, 960) state: "The 
second determinant of European colonization strategy was initial indigenous population density. Where this 
was high, Europeans were more likely to “capture” the local population and put it to work in some form of 
forced labor system. Where initial population density was low, Europeans were more likely to settle 
themselves and less likely to develop extractive institutions even when they did not settle. Acemoglu et al 
(2002) provide evidence that for countries colonized by European powers there is a strong negative 
relationship between population density in 1500 and income per capita today. This relationship is driven by 
the fact that former colonies with greater population density in 1500 had, and still have, worse property rights 
institutions. The density of indigenous population per square kilometer in 1500 is therefore an appealing 
alternative instrument. Because settler mortality and population density in 1500 correspond to different 
sources of variation in practice (the correlation between the two measures is 0.4), but should have similar 
effects on property rights, using these two instruments separately is a good check on our results."  If the curse-
via-politics hypothesis is correct, then we also expect a negative partial correlation in the first-stage equation 
between our proxy for relative natural-resource abundance and the executive constraints index. It is 
noteworthy that Glaeser and coauthors (2004) argue that education trumps institutions. This issue will be 
important in the interpretation of our results, since we also control for capital accumulation and human 
capital. 
16 The imputed values are estimated using all the other explanatory variables in the equation of the 
determinants of executive constraints, namely (log of the absolute value of) net exports of natural resources, 
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  Macroeconomic volatility can also affect economic performance, especially private 
investment. To the extent that natural resources have higher price volatilities than other 
goods, it is possible that this might be a channel through which they affect growth 
performance. Following Servén (2003), our measure of macroeconomic uncertainty is the 
standard deviation of the monthly variation of the log of the Real Effective Exchange Rate 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
 
The empirical neoclassical growth model of MRW includes, in addition to the level 
of education of the population and the investment rate, the growth of “effective units of 
labor,” which is the observed growth of labor for each country minus a global capital-
depreciation rate plus an estimate of the global rate of technological progress. MRW 
assume that the rate of technological progress minus the rate of capital depreciation is equal 
to 0.05 per year. If the neoclassical growth model is correct, the expected coefficient on the 
log of the growth of the effective labor force should be around -0.5. MRW found this to be 
within the confidence intervals of the relevant coefficient only for growth regressions with 
a sample of OECD high-income countries, but not for samples with developing countries. 
For the sake of consistency, we include the MRW variable in the levels as wells as the 
growth regressions.  
 
Lastly, in light of evidence from the Quantile Regressions (see below) suggesting 
that there is substantial heterogeneity in the intercepts, we also include regional dummy 
variables in the 3SLS cross-sectional estimations of the static and dynamic models. The 
regions are classified according to the World Bank’s regional groups into seven groups as 
described in the Appendix table.  
 
VI. B. Descriptive statistics of net exports of natural resources and performance 
 
  Table 1 shows the average annual variation in the terms of trade, the average annual 
growth of GDP per capita, the average value of the executive constraints index, and the 
average growth of exports and imports of natural resources in current U.S. dollars. The data 
show the average of each indicator for countries that were net exporters in all five-year 
periods during 1980-2005, net importers in all periods, and two groups of switchers. The 
lower panel of the table contains the corresponding information for the sample of Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) economies with available data. It is notable that the vast 
majority of countries in the data were either net exporters or importers, and the number of 
switchers is small. In the case of LAC, the switchers were four small economies, including 
El Salvador (became a net exporter on average only during 1985-1989), Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, and Paraguay (net importer only in 1995-1999).  
 
  Interestingly, the net exporters of natural resources experienced terms of trade 
deteriorations on average, while net importers experienced slight improvements. In the 
sample period, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis on the deterioration of the terms of trade 
could be present. But variations in these relative prices would need to affect either the level 
                                                                                                                                                     
growth of the terms of trade, and regional dummies.  
  15of GDP per capita or economic growth in the long-run for the curse to operate through this 
channel. Relevant econometric evidence is discussed in the next section.  
 
  With respect to executive constraints, table 1 shows that for the global sample, net 
exporters of natural resources do tend to have lower scores than net exporters. But this is 
not true for the sample of LAC economies, where net exporters actually have higher 
constraints on the executive branch, and in fact both net exporters and importers of natural 
resources in LAC had higher average scores than the rest of the global averages during this 
time period.   
 
  The growth performance of the net importers was superior to the average of the net 
exporters. Surprisingly, however, the net importers of natural resources experienced 
significantly higher growth rates of the value of natural-resource exports than the net 
exporters, in the global sample. Hence even in this cursory look at the data, it is not clear 






  The results are reported in tables 2-5. Table 2 shows the results from the Quantile 
Regressions applied to the static model with both sets of control variables (but without 
regional dummies). Table 3 reports the corresponding estimations of the dynamic model. 
Tables 4 and 5 contain the 3SLS estimations of both models, including the results with the 
larger samples that use the imputed values of historical population densities. All tables 
report the probability values of the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficient on net 
exports and imports per worker are zero.
17 For ease of exposition, the coefficients on most 
of the other explanatory variables and the tests for equivalence of coefficients across 
quantiles are not reported in the tables, but they are briefly discussed in the text below.  
 
VII. A. Quantile regressions 
 
   In Table 2, the basic model is reported under column 1. Although the only the 
coefficients on imports per worker are statistically significant across all quantiles, the F-
tests suggest that the effect of NX/L on GDP per capita is statistically significant for all 
quantiles. The implied elasticities are about 0.75 for the first quantile, 0.66 for net exporters 
and 0.46 for net importers in the second quantile, and 0.58 and 0.51 respectively in the third 
quantile. This evidence implies that natural resources are a blessing for growth, but there is 
notable heterogeneity across quantiles in this basic specification of the static model. It is 
noteworthy that even if the average share of consumption of natural resources in national 
income were 50%, the effect of K/L on GDP per capita would be quite large, ranging 
between 0.23 and 0.38. Interestingly, the significantly highest elasticities are those of the 
lower quantile, which also have the lower intercepts and are thus the low-income countries.  
 
                                                 
17 For the sub-samples of net importers, the sum is the negative of the coefficient on the log of the absolute 
value of net exports per worker plus the corresponding coefficient on imports per workers.  
  16The fully specified static model reported under column 2 provides more mixed 
evidence of a blessing effect. First, the implied effect is significant only among net 
exporters in the three quantiles – see the F-tests reported at the bottom of the table. These 
blessing effects have implied elasticities in the range of 0.30-0.36, and there is no evidence 
of cross-quantile heterogeneity. Contrary to the curse hypothesis, it seems that the 
heterogenous blessing effect is associated with the macro volatility and/or the MRW factor 
accumulation.  
 
Among the other explanatory variables, only educational attainment is significant in 
the second specification. The range of its coefficient is 0.75 in the lowest quantile to 0.49 in 
the highest quantile. But they are statistically different across quantiles.  
 
  The results in Table 3 correspond to the dynamic growth model. The sums of the 
relevant coefficients in the basic model are statistically significant at the 5% level only for 
net importers in the second quantile and for net exporters and importers in the third 
quantile. Although all point estimates are positive, those for the highest quantile are the 
largest in magnitude, implying that a one percent increase in NX/L is associated with 1.1-
1.9 percentage points rise in the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita during 1980-
2005. Hence it seems that the inter-quantile heterogeneity in growth rates is different from 
the heterogeneity observed in the static model results reported in Table 2. As in the static 
model, however, the results under column 2 of Table 3 suggest that these blessing effects 
disappear after controlling for macro volatility and factor accumulation.  
 
  Regarding other control variables in the dynamic growth models, we found 
significant cross-quantile heterogeneity in the convergence rate and in the coefficient of 
M/L in both specifications. Convergence is stronger among the second and third quantiles, 
but not in the first. Although not statistically different across quantiles, the Sachs-Warner 
reform index is positive and significant in the first two quantiles. Furthermore, the 
investment rate is positive and significant in the upper two quantiles.  
  
  Overall the Quantile-Regressions evidence suggests that it is important to control 
for heterogeneity in intercepts regardless of the model or sample. Also, there is significant 
heterogeneity in the in the effect of natural resources, although it appears strongly only in 
the static model. But the latter are not particularly strong when compared to the intercept 
heterogeneity. Also, the existing studies that argue that there might be heterogeneity in the 
effects of proxies of natural resource abundance, such as Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio 
(2007) might be confounding heterogeneity in other potential determinants of growth with 
heterogeneity of the effects of natural resources. We leave this issue for future research.  
 
  More importantly, any estimation of these models without some heterogeneity of 
intercepts is likely to confound the effects of the explanatory variables with differences in 
the intercepts of the levels and growth rates of GDP per capita. The 3SLS estimations of the 
static and dynamic models discussed below therefore include regional dummies. Future 
research, however, could use panel-data estimators to assess the effect of natural resources 
on growth while also controlling for heterogeneity.   
 
VII. B. 3SLS estimates of the static and dynamic models with endogenous institutions 
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  Tables 4 and 5 contain the relevant results. The first two columns in both tables 
present the results of the basic model, columns 3 and 4 the fully specified model, and 
columns 5-8 contain the corresponding results with the augmented samples utilizing the 
imputed values of historical population densities.  
 
  In Table 4, the blessing effects appear strongly, although admittedly magnified, as 
discussed earlier. Indeed, the elasticity of one for the sub-sample of net importers is 
impossibly large. Moreover, there is no evidence that there is an indirect curse effect via 
institutional constraints on the Executive branch of government, after controlling for 
regional dummies. It is worth noting that historical population density remains a good 
instrument, although only significant at the 10% in the basic model under column 1.  
 
  In the fully specified static model presented in columns 3 and 4, the blessing effect 
remains significant only for the sample of net exporters of natural resources. This elasticity 
is close to 0.25. The elasticity for the sub-sample of net importers declined from a bit over 
one in the basic specification to about 0.19, and it is not statistically significant. Again, 
there is no evidence of a statistically significant average effect of NX/L on executive 
constraints. Furthermore, among the control variables, only the Sachs-Warner reform index 
is statistically significant and positive, and the MRW variable capturing the accumulation 
of effective labor units is negative and significant with coefficient estimate of 
approximately -1.3.  
 
  The comparable results with the expanded samples are strikingly similar. In the 
basic model, there are significant blessing effects among net exporters and importers, with 
the respective elasticities of 0.49 and 0.38. Indeed, the latter estimate for net importers is 
much more reasonable than the estimate of close to one that appeared in the restricted 
sample. In the fully specified model under columns 7 and 8, the blessing effect remains 
significant, but only at the 10% level. Interestingly, there might be a blessing effect via 
institutions, because net exports per worker appear with a positive and significant 
coefficient in column 8. But the point estimates are not significantly different from those 
reported in the columns 1-4, thus suggesting that the results might not be driven by the 
small sample.  
 
  Table 5 also suggests that natural resources could be a blessing, even for growth 
during 1980-2005. In the restricted samples and in the basic specification, this blessing 
effect is significant only among net importers. In contrast, in the fully specified model, but 
with the smaller corresponding sample, the blessing effect is significant only among net 
exporters. In both specifications, there is no evidence of an indirect curse effect via 
institutions.  
 
  With the expanded samples, the blessing effect appears significant for both net 
exporters and net importers in the basic specification. In the full specification, neither is 
significant, again suggesting that if there is a blessing, it might operate through factor 
accumulation and/or macro volatility. Perhaps more importantly, the changes in the point 
estimates and their levels of significance due to the change of samples also suggest that 
there is probably significant heterogeneity of effects across sub-samples of countries.  
  18 
  Among the control variables, the Sachs and Warner reform index appears positive 
and significant in the estimation of models 1 and 3, but not in 5 or 7. The MRW variable of 
the growth of effective units of labor is significant at approximately -0.04 in both the 
restricted and expanded samples in models 3 and 7. This is about one tenth of the 
magnitude predicted by neoclassical growth theory without controlling for the effects of the 
other determinants of growth included in our specifications.  
  
VIII. Summary and Conclusions 
 
  The review of the literature on the resource curse indicated that the evidence in 
support of the curse is weak at best. There are important issues of measurement of relative 
endowments, of potential heterogeneity in the effects of such endowments on development 
and growth, and some of the international econometric evidence that appears to support the 
curse hypothesis has been based on the use of weak proxies, and even on nonstandard 
manipulations of influential data points.  
 
  This mixed evidence in favor of the resource curse also needs to face up to some 
obvious historical facts, ranging from the successful development of now rich countries, to 
the success of numerous developing economies, ranging from Rwanda to Chile. Moreover, 
the idea that natural resources inevitably worsen political or other institutions that might be 
important for development also seems to have ignored historical facts related to the 
evolution of such institutions, and there are examples where “good” institutional 
characteristics had emerged prior to the discovery of natural resources, for example, in the 
case of Venezuela, which may explain the strong economic growth of this economy for 
almost 50 years.  
 
  In the process of reviewing the existing literature and linking it to current data, we 
have highlighted an important weakness in the empirical literature that uses trade-based 
proxies for relative endowments. That is, the variables of choice of the propagators of the 
curse are weak proxies for relative endowments. Our own previous work had ignored the 
analytical contents of these empirical proxies, which might explain why we had been able 
to so easily drive a stake of doubt into the heart of the resource demons.  
 
  Our preferred proxy, net exports per worker, while flawed, can help push the 
literature forward, because in certain circumstances, the simultaneous estimation of 
coefficients for the samples of net exporters and net importers can provide a magnified 
effect of natural resources on development.  
 
  With new data, new econometric analyses provided definitive evidence that there is 
no curse, not even indirectly by affecting the political institutions that would be most likely 
to be affected by the curse-via-politics effects, which has been central in the literature on 
the “point-source” nature of natural resources. In fact, the direct positive effect of natural 
resources can be substantial, although we cannot be sure about its exact magnitude due to 
the imperfect correlation between relative endowments and our trade-data proxy variable. 
Furthermore, we found heterogeneity in the potential blessing effects of natural resource 
endowments. More specifically, in the static model, the poorest countries benefit the most, 
  19whereas in the dynamic model, the richest seem to have benefitted the most. But in both 
cases, these blessing effects tend to disappear after controlling for macro volatility and 
factor accumulation.  
 
  In the process, we are convinced that we know less than what we thought we knew, 
especially from reading the existing literature. It remains a topic for future research to study 
potential interactions between natural resources and human capital or innovation. But we 
do know that there might be substantial international heterogeneity in the effects of other 
determinants of growth, and there is certainly cross-country heterogeneity intercept. Hence 
any cross-sectional estimation with cross-country data needs to control for mean shifters, 
such as regional dummies. Preferably, panel-data estimators should be applied, because 
they allow for controlling for fixed effects.  
 
  Similarly, much remains to be learned from historical case studies and perhaps from 
cross-country statistical analysis of the interaction between natural resources and 
institutions, in spite of the unreliable existing evidence concerning the curse-through-
politics hypothesis. From a policy viewpoint, institutional arrangements to smooth out the 
economic consequences of natural-resource windfalls makes as much sense as more general 
discussions about counter-cyclical fiscal policies. That is, in spite of the elusive resource 
curse, we do not argue against common sense policies that in some countries might be 
inextricable from natural riches.  
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Table 1. Net Exporters, Net Importers, and Switchers: Selected Indicators 
1980 -2005   Terms of 
Trade  
growth 











Sample: All Countries, observations with data 
Net Natural Resource 
Exporters in all periods  -0.41%  0.61%  3.97  2.22%  1.41% 
  (53) (59)  (58)  (54) (54) 
Net Natural Resource 
Importers in all periods  0.11%  2.18%  4.88  3.31%  3.55% 
  (63) (72)  (57)  (69) (69) 
Net Exporters that became 
Net Importers in any period 
after 1985  0.83% -0.33%  3.60  -2.47% -0.64% 
  (7) (11) (10)  (10) (10) 
Net Importers that became 
Net Exporters  in any period 
after 1985  0.21% 1.29%  4.05  3.35% 7.40% 
  (12) (14)  (14)  (13) (13) 
 
Sample: LAC Countries 
Net Natural Resource 
Exporters in all periods  -0.42%  0.34%  5.48  2.56%  2.64% 
  (15) (14)  (13)  (15) (15) 
Net Natural Resource 
Importers in all periods  0.01%  1.56%  4.99  -0.68%  -2.07% 
  (6) (9)  (4)  (8) (9) 
Net Exporters that became 
Net Importers in any period 
after 1985  0.42% -0.63%  4.34  3.94%  4.53% 
  (3) (3)  (3)  (3) (3) 
Net Importers that became 
Net Exporters  in any period 
after 1985  -0.49% 0.88%  5.00  6.00%  2.66% 
  (1) (1)  (1)  (1) (1) 
Notes: The numbers inside parentheses are the countries in each group. 
 
 Table 2. Quantile Regression Results of the Static Model without Regional Dummies 
Dependent Variable:  Log GDP per capita in 2005 (PPP$) 
  q25 
Positive_ln(NX/L) 0.205  0.120 
 (1.93)  (1.17) 
Negative_ln_abs(NX/L) -0.015  0.028 
 (0.20)  (0.25) 
Positive_ln(M/L) 0.541  0.184 
 (4.56)**  (1.61) 
Negative_ln_(M/L) 0.730  0.304 
   (5.69)**  (0.92) 
  q50 
Positive_ln(NX/L) 0.087  0.098 
 (1.21)  (1.96) 
Negative_ln_abs(NX/L) 0.068  0.084 
 (1.28)  (0.98) 
Positive_ln(M/L) 0.569  0.261 
 (6.60)**  (2.08)* 
Negative_ln_(M/L) 0.528  0.164 
   (8.07)**  (1.73) 
  q75 
Positive_ln(NX/L) 0.122  0.088 
 (2.57)*  (1.32) 
Negative_ln_abs(NX/L) 0.026  0.086 
 (0.52)  (0.82) 
Positive_ln(M/L) 0.460  0.240 
 (6.83)**  (1.31) 
Negative_ln_(M/L) 0.533  0.311 
   (9.20)**  (1.84) 
Constant q25  9.088  5.215 
 (40.37)**  (3.94)** 
Constant q50  9.486  6.294 
 (52.07)**  (3.54)** 
Constant q75  9.537  6.732 
   (65.12)**  (2.74)** 
  Sum of Coefficients (F-Tests, P-values) 
q25: Postive_ln(NX/L)+Positive_ln(M/L)=0  0.746 [0.00]  0.304 [0.00] 
q25: - Negative_ln_abs(NX/L)+Negative_ln(M/L)=0  0.745 [0.00]  0.276 [0.32] 
q50: Postive_ln(NX/L)+Positive_ln(M/L)=0  0.656 [0.00]  0.359 [0.00] 
q50: - Negative_ln_abs(NX/L)+Negative_ln(M/L)=0  0.460 [0.00]  0.080 [0.44] 
q75: Postive_ln(NX/L)+Positive_ln(M/L)=0  0.582 [0.00]  0.328 [0.04] 
q75: - Negative_ln_abs(NX/L)+Negative_ln(M/L)=0  0.507 [0.00]  0.225 [0.47] 
Observations 103  74 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
Other control variables included (see text) but not reported.   
Model 1 includes: Sachs-Warner reform index (average during 1980-2005), average annual growth of terms 
of trade. 
  28Model 2 includes: Variables in model (1) plus real-exchange rate volatility, log of average investment rate, 
log average years of education, and MRW. 
  29Table 3. Quantile Regression Results of the Dynamic Model without Regional Dummies 
   (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable:  Average annual GDP per capita growth, 1980-2005 
  q25 
Positive_ln(NX/L) 0.000  0.001 
 (0.18)  (0.07) 
Negative_ln_abs(NX/L) -0.002  -0.003 
 (0.81)  (0.33) 
Positive_ln(M/L) 0.004  0.000 
 (1.21)  (1.03) 
Negative_ln_(M/L) 0.003  0.000 
   (0.74)  (1.52) 
  q50 
Positive_ln(NX/L) 0.002  0.000 
 (0.85)  (0.33) 
Negative_ln_abs(NX/L) -0.002  -0.007 
 (0.68)  (1.53) 
Positive_ln(M/L) 0.004  -0.001 
 (1.01)  (0.16) 
Negative_ln_(M/L) 0.008  0.009 
   (1.80)  (0.01) 
  q75 
Positive_ln(NX/L) 0.003  0.000 
 (1.25)  (0.17) 
Negative_ln_abs(NX/L) -0.004  -0.001 
 (1.05)  (0.77) 
Positive_ln(M/L) 0.008  0.004 
 (2.11)*  (0.11) 
Negative_ln_(M/L) 0.015  0.000 
   (2.24)*  (0.05) 
q25: Constant  0.003  -0.037 
 (0.05)  (0.89) 
q50: Constant  0.078  0.148 
 (1.61)  (0.55) 
q75: Constant  0.19  0.057 
   (3.61)**  (2.46)* 
 F-tests,  P-values 
q25: Postive_ln(NX/L)+Positive_ln(M/L)=0  0.004 [0.30]  0.001 [0.91] 
q25: - Negative_ln_abs(NX/L)+Negative_ln(M/L)=0  0.005 [0.14]  0.003 [0.96] 
q50: Postive_ln(NX/L)+Positive_ln(M/L)=0  0.006 [0.06]  -0.001 [0.75] 
q50: - Negative_ln_abs(NX/L)+Negative_ln(M/L)=0  0.010 [0.16]  0.016 [0.61] 
q75: Postive_ln(NX/L)+Positive_ln(M/L)=0  0.011 [0.00]  0.004 [0.28] 
q75: - Negative_ln_abs(NX/L)+Negative_ln(M/L)=0  0.019 [0.02]  0.001 [0.12] 
Observations 84  74 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
Other control variables included (see text) but not reported.   
Model 1 includes: Log GDP per capita in 1980 (PPP$), Sachs-Warner reform index (average during 1980-
2005), average annual growth of terms of trade. 
  30  31
Model 2 includes: Variables in model (1) plus real-exchange rate volatility, log of average investment rate, 
log average years of education, and MRW. 
 Table 4. 3SLS Estimates of the Static Model with Endogenous Institutions  
















































Positive_ln(NX/L) 0.156  -0.02  0.015  0.045  0.14  -0.013  0.055  0.059 
 (2.29)*  (0.65)  (0.20)  (1.28)  (1.96)  (0.54)  (0.95)  (2.09)* 
Negative_ln_abs(NX/L) -0.105  -0.027  0.149  -0.061  0.069  -0.046  0.045  -0.031 
 (0.91)  (0.69)  (1.24)  (1.51)  (1.03)  (1.64)  (0.72)  (0.95) 
Positive_ln(M/L) 0.351    0.233    0.35    0.131   
 
(3.47)*
*   (2.16)*   
(2.77)
**   (1.38)   
Negative_ln_abs(M/L)  0.932    0.334   0.448   0.178   
 
(4.50)*
*   (1.65)   
(5.01)
**   (1.57)  
Log  Executive  Constraints  1.416    1.427   1.972   1.148   
 
(2.72)*
*   (2.28)*   (1.60)  (1.85)  
Log population density 
1500    -0.079     -0.105           
   (1.96)     
(3.12)*
*           
Imputed Log Population 
Density 1500              -0.084     -0.102 
                  (2.14)*    
(3.09)*
* 
  Sum of Coefficients [F-Tests, P-values] 





[0.000]  n.a. 
0.248 
[0.0369]  n.a. 
0.490 
[0.00]  n.a. 
0.19 






]  n.a. 
0.0190 
[0.5459]  n.a. 
0.38 
[0.00]  n.a. 
0.13 
[0.39]  n.a. 
Observations  51  51  43  43 98 98  71  71 
R-squared  0.77  0.63  0.89  0.73 0.65 0.62  0.92  0.75 
Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses            
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%            
Other control variables included (see text) but 
not  reported.          
Models 1 and 5 include Log GDP per capita in 1980, Sachs-Warner reform index (average during 1980-
2005), average annual growth of terms of trade, regional dummies. 
Models 2 and 6 include average annual growth of the terms of trade 
(1980-2005), regional dummies.        
Models 3 and 7 include variables in model (1) plus real-exchange rate volatility, log of average investment 
rate, log average years of education, and MRW. 
Models 4 and 8 include the same variables as in model (2).          
  32Table 5. 3SLS Estimates of the Dynamic Model with Endogenous Institutions 












































Positive_ln(NX/L) -0.0021 -0.0205 -0.0012 0.0450 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0007 0.0590
  (1.18) (0.65) (0.76) (1.28) (0.17) (0.00) (0.37) (2.09)*
Negative_ln_abs(NX/L) -0.0028 -0.0270 0.0007 -0.0610 -0.0047 -0.0181 -0.0029 -0.0310
  (1.10) (0.69) (0.26) (1.51) (2.32)* (0.56) (1.17) (0.95) 
Positive_ln(M/L)  0.0060  0.0026  0.0056  0.0030  
  (2.18)*   (1.12)  (2.15)*  (1.01)  
Negative_ln_abs(M/L)  0.0126  0.0062  0.0104  0.0044  
  (2.40)*   (1.37)   (2.64)**   (1.21)  
Log  Executive  Constraints  0.0212  0.0020  0.2732  0.0211  
  (1.99)  (1.58)  (1.29)  (0.86)  
Log population density 1500    -0.0790    -0.1050          
   (1.96)    
(3.12)*
*          
Imputed log population density 
1500              -0.1022     -0.102
                 
(3.09)*
*    
(3.09)*
* 



















[0.0043]  n.a. 
0.01 
[0.1668]  n.a. 
Observations  51 51 43 43 79 79 71 71 
R-squared  0.77 0.63 0.82 0.73 0.51 0.68 0.92 0.75 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%              
Other control variables included (see text) but not 
reported.        
Models 1 and 5 include Log GDP per capita in 1980, Sachs-Warner reform index (average during 1980-
2005), average annual growth of terms of trade, regional dummies. 
Models 2 and 6 include average annual growth of the terms of trade 
(1980-2005), regional dummies.        
Models 3 and 7 include variables in model (1) plus real-exchange rate volatility, log of average investment 
rate, log average years of education, and MRW. 
Models 4 and 8 include the same variables as in 
model (2).        
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Table A1. Data, Variable Definitions and Sources 




Natural resources net exports divided by the labor force. Natural 
resources net exports is defined as exports minus imports of natural 
resources related goods based on Leamer (1995)
a commodity 
clusters. Labor force is the population between 15-64 years.  
WDI and UN 
COMTRADE 
GDP per capita 
growth 1980-2005 
Average yearly growth of real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: 





log GDP per capita  Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series). Ratio of total 
GDP to total population in 2005. 
Penn World 
Tables 
Openness  Percentage of years with open economic regime. A country has a 
closed trade policy if it has at least one of the following 
characteristics: 1. Nontariff barriers (NTBs) covering 40 percent or 
more of trade. 2. Average tariff rates of 40 percent or more. 3. A 
black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20 percent or 
more relative to the official exchange rate, on average, during the 
1970s or 1980s. 4. A socialist economic system 5. A state 






Terms of Trade 
growth 
Growth of the external terms of trade, defined as the ratio of an 
export price index to an import price index of goods and services 
WDI 
Std. Dev. Real 
Effective 
Exchange Rate 




using IMF data 
Executive 
Constraints 
Institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief 
executives, weather individuals or collectivities. It is a 1-7 category 
scale, higher score means more constraint on the executive. Equals 
one if country is not independent. 
Polity IV 2004  
log Investment  Natural log of the share 





Natural log of years of schooling of the adult population  Barro and Lee 
(2000) 
MRW  Based on Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), the variable is the 
natural log of the average growth of the labor force plus 0.05. The 
constant 0.05 is assumed to be the sum of depreciation rate and 




Total population divided by total arable land in 1500 A.D.   McEvedy and 
Jones (1978) as 
cited in 
Acemoglu, et al. 
(2002). 
Regions dummies  8 Dummies for world regions as defined by the World Bank: East 
Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, High income: OECD, High 
income: non OECD, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & 
North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharian Africa 
The World Bank 
a. SITC sections 0-9, 11, 12, 21-29, 32-35, 41-43, 63, 64, 68, 94    
  34Table A2. Summary Statistics 
Cross-Section; All Variables in 2005 
Variable Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
GDP per capita growth 1980-2005  138  0.01359 0.02048 
log GDP pc in 1980  152  8.30638 1.10774 
Executive Constraints  155  1.23111 0.61816 
Natural Resources/labor force > 0  133  0.67116 2.48421 
Natural Resources/labor force < 0  133  0.15405 0.57328 
Openness 141  0.55319 0.41906 
Std. Dev. Real Effective Exchange 
Rate 175  0.06932 0.0793 
log Investment  184  2.47441 0.57929 
log School Attainment  97  1.58728 0.62581 
MRW 185  -2.6602  0.20589 
Terms of Trade growth  145  0.00302 0.04458 
log Population density in 1500  97  0.48645 1.5247 
      
Periods Data 
Variable Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
GDP per capita growth 1980-2005  1180  1.65291 3.38209 
log GDP pc  1180  8.25806 1.11805 
Natural Resources/labor force > 0  1133  7.10709 6.80923 
Natural Resources/labor force < 0  1133  6.0296  6.76471 
Executive Constraints  1238  1.12357 0.71623 
log Investment  1430  2.5931  0.68728 
log School Attainment  822  1.42065 0.75464 
Terms of Trade growth  914  -0.0013  0.04278 
Openness 904  0.44757 0.48416 
log Population density in 1500  882  0.50312 1.51883 
 
 
  35Appendix A3  Details on Sources of Bias in NX/L Proxy 
 
  In the context of our two-sector growth model, an exogenous labor-productivity 
shock associated with sector 1 and, for simplicity, assuming that the shock does not affect 









) or the stock of K and L or the consumption shares, 
the marginal change in net exports per worker associated with a marginal change in 
productivity: 
 
(12)  () () nr nr
L
l c a





This consumption effect of a productivity improvement is strictly negative.
18 Hence the 
reverse effect of productivity growth on observed net exports of natural resources would be 
reflected in a decline in net exports of natural resources per worker, and any estimation of 
an income or growth model with NX/L as an explanatory variable will yield downward 
biased estimates of the effect of NX/L on Y. Allowing for a re-allocation of labor into 
sector 1 as a consequence of the improvement in productivity in that sector would further 
reduce net exports of natural resources per worker, thus further biasing estimates of the 
effect of NX/L on Y.  
 













⎛ • − = ∂
∂ 1 / . 
 
If there is a curse,  ,  then NX/L would decline as exports earnings fall more than 
imports because cnr>0. The fall in gross imports of natural resources would be proportional 
to the share of income spent in the consumption of natural resources: 










c a  
when  . Under a curse, the negative effect of NX/L would be attenuated by the fall 
of imports. If natural resources are a blessing in terms of improvements in labor 
productivity in either sector, then imports would rise with income (which is the reason why 
the coefficient on NX/L is biased downward in income functions). Hence reverse causality 
under a blessing effect would bias the estimated coefficient of NX/L downwards due to the 
rise of imports of natural resources. However tempting it is to estimate (8) and (9) with 
NX/L as a proxy for unobserved K/L, this discussion highlights biases due to the 
consumption effect that will contaminate estimates of the effect of NX/L on Y. 
0 < ∂ nr a
 
  To address the endogeneity biases, we estimate augmented versions of the static and 
dynamic models, which include the natural logarithm of imports of natural resources per 
                                                 
18 Please note that a productivity shock affecting the natural-resource sector would correspond to a positive (a 
“blessing”) shock on output. The earlier version of this paper had erroneously confounded this positive effect 
with an endogenous decline in NX/L due to a positive productivity shock in sector 1.  
  36worker (M/L) as an additional regressor. Table 1 summarizes the expected coefficients 
under three scenarios. If there is a resource curse, then the coefficients on NX/L and M/L 
would be negative – see discussion on equation (11) above. If natural resources are a 
blessing, then the coefficient on NX/L and M/L should be positive. The attenuation effect 
of the reverse causality effect would be captured by the coefficient on imports.  
 
 
More formally, the estimated model can be re-written to account explicitly for the 
reverse causality effect: 
 
(14)   yi = a + ( ) M x d d d − −  (ln(NX/L)i) + f’Xi + ei , 
 
where coefficient b in (9) equals  M X d d d − − , which is the sum of the direct effect minus 
the reverse-causality effect. In the context of our two-sector growth model and assuming 
that the relevant effects operate only through changes in productivities in either sector, the 







































− . The reverse causality effect 
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⎛ • ∂ + − • ∂ = + , which is a composite 
consumption effect coming from increases in factor productivity in each sector and will 
equal the effect of y on gross imports (exports) of natural resources per worker. By 
including M/L in the estimation equation we can get an estimate of  M d .
19 Thus the 
empirical income function becomes: 
 
(15) yi = a +  x d d −  (ln(NX/L)i) +  M d  (ln(M/L)i) + c’Xi + ei .  
 
We assume that consumption effect on exports is equal to the consumption effect on 
imports. Thus the sum of  x d d −  plus  M d  approximates an unbiased estimate of the 
elasticity of y with respect to NX/L.  
  



























= . The function linking K/L with NX/L 
was presented above in the discussion of equation (11): 
                                                 
19 Alternatively, we could include X/L, but the resulting estimate could be contaminated by a supply-side 
effect on exports.  
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. The supply and consumption components in our 
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=  is the consumption-
driven attenuation of the corresponding elasticity.  
 
  It is trivial to show that the marginal effect of K/L on y is the product of the 
marginal of effect of NX/L on y times the marginal effect of K/L on NX/L.  After stripping 
out d  with the inclusion of M/L as a regressor in (15), the estimate of the effect of K/L on 
y, based on our proxy, is still biased: 
 
(16)  ()













That is, the downward bias in z produces a multiplicatively positive bias for the inference 
about the effect of K/L on y based on estimates of the effect of NX/L on y. In other words, 
because the supply elasticity of NX/L with respect to K/L is under-estimated due to the 
consumption effect, any blessing or curse effect apparent in the approximated elasticity of y 
with respect to NX/L will be an exaggerated measure of the underlying effect of K/L on y. 
Multiplying  ( ) M X d d d + −  by one plus the share of income spent in the consumption of 
natural resources would yield an estimate closer to an unbiased estimate of the elasticity of 
y with respect to K/L.  
 
  38